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It is not a great step from the current controversy waxing torrid
about the fundamental law of our land to Professor McLaughlin's
Pulitzer Prize-winning volume, .4 Constitutional History of the United
States. Hardly any contribution could aid the reader better to think
objectively about recent developments, or, if that is impossible, to
rearrange his prejudices in the light of past events critically described.
Professor McLaughlin has spent the greater part of a lifetime in the
study of constitutional origins and change; and this summary exposition
presents his most important conclusions in a scientific and catholic spirit
and a classic style.
Professor McLaughlin finds the sources of American constitution-
alism in the dualistic structure of the old British empire. After the
Revolution principles of limited sovereignty were carried forth from the
British experience and incorporated in the new American order, induc-
ing a written fundamental law, inescapable by governments, and the
federal system.
In their search for criteria by which to question authority of gov-
ernment, James Otis, Samuel Adams, Patrick Henry, and the other
firebrands had not far to look. They found their advocate in John
Locke, philosophic apologist for the parliamentary party in the Revolu-
tion of I688. He had said, in short:
"The critical question . . . was how it came about that one man, a
monarch, or one set of men had been placed above other men with power to
i~sue orders, laws, and decrees; if governmental power was derived, if men
voluntarily and by consent had surrendered their original equality, then, un-
questionably, government was authoritative only when acting within the limits
of the compact and when guarding the natural rights of life, liberty, and
property. Before government was established, men were in a state of equality;
after government was established they were not; they gave up their equality
and subjected themselves to a superior; but this superior must rule for the
common good." lIVcLaughlin's History, p. 104.
Against governmental excesses there was the right to revolution. What
better basis could there be to demand the rights of Englishmen to rep-
resentation? Even at a time when Old Sarum and other blighted
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constituencies fed the House of Commons and the men of Britain de-
fended their position by citing their own poor representation, Locke's
words could hardly be nullities to Englishmen so few generations re-
moved from the latter seventeenth century. His writings caught on in
America as the Mosaic Law of English constitutionalism. Originally
visionary descants, they were accepted as descriptive of real natural
rights. The persistence of the "compact" philosophy today is a fair
indicator of the strength of its origins. When Jeremy Bentham termed
natural law "rhetorical nonsense on stilts" he was not voicing the
unanimous sentiment of his time or of our own.
British statesmen could announce with unmitigated fervor the
supreme and unlimited authority of Parliament, but Americans were
unwilling to concede such absolute power to so limited a body. Pleading
the cause of the common man, they saw the need of a written document.
But the writing alone was not enough. It must be binding. It must be
enforced by the courts of law. This particular judicial power rests
"plainly on historical forces" rather than on formal logical argument
(page 31o). "It is the culmination of the essentials of Revolutionary
thinking and, indeed, of the thinking of those who a hundred years and
more before the Revolution called for a government of laws and not
of men" (page 310). The doctrine of "judicial review" arose out of
a quest for non-autocratic government. English precedent was found
for granting to the "natural rights" concepts the force of law. A fixed
constitution superior to legislative authority became more than a precept
of optional enforcement and as rigorously binding as a statute. Herein
lies a significant distinction between United States and European consti-
tutional law. The Continental constitution is little more than an expres-
sion of political philosophy prevalent at the time of its writing. It may
be amended by the appropriate legislative body as readily as any statute.
The courts abroad enforce the constitution only insofar as the legislature
has incorporated it into the statute. In the United States, the Constitu-
ion stands as a law, enforcible as such in the courts without the additional
prerogative of legislative grant, free from Congressional whim, amend-
able not by subsequent statute but by specific reference to the people or
to the state legislatures as barometers of the popular will.'
The force of John Marshall in setting limits and in establishing the
judicial review as a prerogative of his court is clearly indicated by the
fight between Andrew Jackson and the United States Bank. The
Supreme Court upheld the Banking Act of i8l6. "It is significant that
'Another manifestation of the conviction that governmental authorities should be
limited and offset is the doctrine of separation of powers. It is the American expression
of Montesquieu, who was understood to advocate "checks and balances."
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in i832 men should put forward a judicial decision as conclusive, not
only in determining the validity of a measure already passed, but as
finally and peremptorily binding on the legislature when a new measure
is presented for passage" (page 41 i).
Professor McLaughlin traces the dialectics of John C. Calhoun with
great care. The great Southerner knew that to justify nullification the
states must be a mere league of sovereignties. The Constitution must
be a contract of such a league, he contended, because sovereignty is
indivisible and cannot be surrendered and separate adoption by the states
precludes the possibility of establishment of a new entity. The funda-
mental fallacy, says Professor McLaughlin, lies just there. What is to
prevent sovereignties A and B, acting as geographic units, from merging
into a common new government, C, if they so desire? If they do so
successfully merge, can one still hold it impossible? His issue dead,
Calhoun still lives as a symbol of rationalization to reach a conclusion.
It is somewhat comforting to remember that the recognition of the
possibility of "packing" the Supreme Court is not a phenomenon of this
century. In the intersectional disputes centering about the principles
decided in the Dred Scott case northern partisans did not hesitate to
charge that a proslavery conspiracy had resulted in a "packed" Court.
At that time a point in issue was not so much the unacceptability of the
"packing" principle, which was generally conceded, but rather the
validity of the denial of Southern protagonists of any such purpose. Re-
publican denunciations of "judicial tyranny" were particularly harsh and
widespread between 1857 and 1864. Congress and President Lincoln
displayed for Taney's decisions and opinions an almost complete con-
tempt. It must be admitted, however, that the thought and sentiments
of the masses were not so deeply affected as today. Lincoln had no
radio with outlets in more than twenty million homes and public places.
Out of the Civil War period there arose numerous problems of
administration. It is strange that the American Revolution is reflected
so faintly in the Constitution on the subject of conduct of war. As a
result of the war emergency and this lack of precision the executive
position was strengthened by declaring lapses in minor constitutional
limitations on the theory of necessity to preserve the essence of the basic
law. The pertinence of this fact to modern consideration is in the the-
oretical possibility that a president may dispose of the "constitutional
system," set up a dictatorship, and claim for his precedent in despotism
the conduct of Abraham Lincoln. The thing to note, however, is that
Lincoln in the rtle of dictator did not, with all his power, "purge"
Congress, force elections, and quash the attacks of his political opponents
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by "military protection". 2 Not what could be done but what was done
was significant then as it is now. The functional force behind the Con-
stitution is derived from the democratic spirit and habits of mind of the
governed people. The formulated doctrines without basis in belief
would make of the simple document a mockery of an opposed idealism
and a sham. The test of the fair interpretation becomes not the fact
that a thing was done illegally in that it contravened constitutional defi-
nitions but rather that much was not done that might have been in
violation of the best judgment of the democratic-minded people.
In his history of the Fourteenth Amendment, Professor McLaugh-
lin makes apparent two principles operative in the establishment of the
status of the Supreme Court. First, the power to interpret the due
process clause of the Amendment has grown gradually into the power
of a discretionary veto upon every state legislature. Second, the exer-
cise of that power depends upon the social philosophy of the judges.
Decisions, in increasing measure, deal with legislation in the light of an
unpartisan, realistic study of the conditions affected. The courts have
had the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment constantly in mind.
They have had to evaluate new regulation of control of individual
conduct and individual use of property in a degree of variance with the
older ideas. Constitutional law has become acknowledged as a develop-
ing science, or at least, as not necessarily bound to conceptions of the
eighteenth century. It is distinctly perceptible that the courts have shifted
their emphasis from a special regard for individual rights to a fuller
appreciation of public needs.
The Supreme Court has had a difficult task. The whole theory of
judicial review has been attacked on the ground that the constitutionality
of a statute has been conditioned upon whether the particular judges
participating in the decision considered the legislation advisable. "Im-
mutable principles of social competence and rectitude cannot be em-
bodied in any series of decisions, however learned they may be" (page
758). It must be remembered, however, that a standard of "reason-
ableness" allows accommodation to new conditions of society and altered
concepts of the essence of liberty. Before one can sweep aside the power
of the judges to weigh imponderables of constitutionality, he must be
willing to accept more hasty alteration of constitutional principles. This
may be more dangerous than the obstruction of reasoned circumspection.
It is not at all clear that a rational degree of progress has been impeded
by our written Constitution. Whereas many acts have been declared
void in recent years, no small number of the laws have had but vague
2 See J. G. Randall, "Lincoln in the R61e of Dictator," South Atlantic Quarterly,
XXV1II, pp. 236-z52, cited by Professor McLaughlin, p. 639-
relation to public good. Many laws have been hastily drawn by legis-
lators without their proper share of appreciation of responsibility in a
developing society.
Meriting equal emphasis with definite limitations expressed in recent
opinions, is the emergence of all phases of national over state government.
The establishment of commissions intrusted with extensive power, gen-
erally defined by statutory grant, gave rise to the belief that there was
practically no danger of over-delegation of power. Professor McLaugh-
lin, closing his discussion with 1932, does not consider the potential
limitations upon the conferring of legislative authority as they have been
expressed in the Schechter decision and others. Despite such recent cases
the administrative power becomes greater in constantly enlarging fields.
Congress drafts bill upon bill expanding national influence into formerly
unlegislated zones to meet needs newly apparent or which up to the
moment could not be provided for because of a narrower definition of
the national sphere in the constitutional system. In this direction the
Supreme Court has given broader construction to such phrases as "power
to regulate commerce . . . among the several states" and "due process
of law." Numerous decisions have established more dearly, and in many
cases not too narrowly to foster centralized government, the limits of
legislative areas which before had been too conjectural to permit of
development of a far-reaching policy.
Expanding with other departments has been the office of the execu-
tive. As an initiator and custodian of new bills the President mold.
legislative policy. His veto and patronage powers are strong forces to
induce support. But we need not fear his power. Fascist, Communist,
and other state eruptions expressed in the toll of intrigues of leaders
famished for fame and power are not likely to threaten seriously our
system so long as it meets the general standards of orderly popular gov-
ernment, adequately efficient. Legislative blindness, obstructionism,
indefinite and nonassignable responsibility, incoherent and self-destructive
party policies, oppression of minority interests - these constitute the real
dangers operative through a changed philosophy of government.
The two-party system, which emerged in our country by a political
quirk rather than by deliberate provision, has been notably superior
to the multi-party counterpart in European governments. Unethical
as our parties at times appear to be, it must be conceded that each has
been strong enough to activate the other. An important element of our
system which is achieved by minority representation of whatever type is
legislative concession. Even though a minority cannot pass a bill it may
joust the majority into a modified position and thus aid its cause. Our
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government has not suffered the disastrous inability of European gov-
ernments to fix authority with a distinct majority. The multi-party
systems have experienced a ruling plurality at odds with an antagonistic
majority. In our system the brunt of the legislative burden is borne
by the majority which is the plurality. How accountable his party is
held for its legislative acts every Congressman knows all too well.
Institutionalists are likely to feel that so great stress on the state is an
undue delimitation of the field of constitutional history. After all, it is
urged, the sociological structure is constituted of many institutions of
which the state is merely an important one. Commercial, cultural, scien-
tific, religious, and scholastic organizations have their juridical constitu-
ents. Constitutional history should comprise the whole province.
Professor McLaughlin, a constitutionalist, concludes that through the
rise and fall of the other systems elsewhere "the American constitutional
system still stands." (Page 794) The question it seems necessary to ask
is just what American constitutional system he refers to as the one that
"still stands." Conceding him, however, the limits of his approach, he
has discerned definite patterns of continuity in the emergence of the
democratic state that render present fact situations relative. Within the
scope of its purpose this makes good history.
LEO STONE
"LAWYER LINCOLN" - Albert A. Woldman. Hougzton-
Mifflin Co., Boston and New York, r936. $3.50
One hundred years ago, the name of a former backwoodsman,
storekeeper, and deputy surveyor was formally enrolled as "the Hon.
A. Lincoln, Esquire, Attorney and Counsellor at Law," licensed to
practice law in all the courts of the State of Illinois. In commemora-
tion of this centennial, Albert A. Woldman of the Cleveland Bar has
written this book dealing with the immortal Emancipator's career as a
lawyer and with the legal and constitutional problems which confronted
him as Civil War President.
The author has made this timely addition to the vast store of
Lincolniana because he believes that Lincoln is the law profession's
noblest contribution to Americin civilization and that, without his
twenty-three years of experience at the bar, he might never have become
President of the United States. Unfortunately, the influence of the
first belief has prevented Mr. Woldman from completely accomplish-
ing his express purpose of producing a realistic picture of Lincoln which
would be free from the obscuring cloak of hero-worship. While the
